diff --git a/lib/aikido/zen/scanners/shell_injection/helpers.rb b/lib/aikido/zen/scanners/shell_injection/helpers.rb
index 9160961e..3d47d040 100644
--- a/lib/aikido/zen/scanners/shell_injection/helpers.rb
+++ b/lib/aikido/zen/scanners/shell_injection/helpers.rb
@@ -22,53 +22,110 @@ module Helpers
     # @param command [string]
     # @param user_input [string]
     def self.is_safely_encapsulated(command, user_input)
-      segments = command.split(user_input)
-
-      # The next condition is merely here to be compliant with what javascript does when splitting strings:
-      # From js doc https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/String/split
-      #   > If separator appears at the beginning (or end) of the string, it still has the effect of splitting,
-      #   > resulting in an empty (i.e. zero length) string appearing at the first (or last) position of
-      #   > the returned array.
-      # This is necessary because this code is ported form the firewall-node code.
-      if user_input.length > 1
-        if command.start_with? user_input
-          segments.unshift ""
-        end
-
-        if command.end_with? user_input
-          segments << ""
-        end
+      # Return false if user input is not in the command
+      return true unless command.include?(user_input)
+
+      # Find all occurrences of user_input in command
+      occurrences = []
+      start_pos = 0
+      while (pos = command.index(user_input, start_pos))
+        occurrences << pos
+        start_pos = pos + 1
       end
 
-      # Call the helper function to get current and next segments
-      get_current_and_next_segments(segments).all? do |segments_pair|
-        char_before_user_input = segments_pair[:current_segment][-1]
-        char_after_user_input = segments_pair[:next_segment][0]
-
-        # Check if the character before is an escape character
-        is_escape_char = ESCAPE_CHARS.include?(char_before_user_input)
+      # Check if all occurrences are safely encapsulated
+      occurrences.all? do |occurrence_index|
+        is_occurrence_safely_encapsulated(command, user_input, occurrence_index)
+      end
+    end
 
-        unless is_escape_char
-          next false
+    # Check if a specific occurrence of user_input in command is safely encapsulated
+    # by parsing shell quote state from the beginning of the command
+    def self.is_occurrence_safely_encapsulated(command, user_input, occurrence_index)
+      quote_state = nil  # nil = unquoted, "'" = single-quoted, '"' = double-quoted
+      i = 0
+      
+      while i < occurrence_index
+        char = command[i]
+        
+        if quote_state.nil?
+          # We're in unquoted context
+          if char == '\\'
+            # Backslash escapes the next character in unquoted context
+            i += 1
+          elsif char == "'"
+            quote_state = "'"
+          elsif char == '"'
+            quote_state = '"'
+          end
+        elsif quote_state == "'"
+          # We're in single-quoted context
+          # In single quotes, nothing is special except the closing single quote
+          if char == "'"
+            quote_state = nil
+          end
+        elsif quote_state == '"'
+          # We're in double-quoted context
+          if char == '\\'
+            # Skip the next character (it's escaped)
+            i += 1
+          elsif char == '"'
+            quote_state = nil
+          end
         end
+        
+        i += 1
+      end
 
-        # If characters before and after the user input do not match, return false
-        next false if char_before_user_input != char_after_user_input
-
-        # If user input contains the escape character, return false
-        next false if user_input.include?(char_before_user_input)
-
-        # Handle dangerous characters inside double quotes
-        if char_before_user_input == '"' && DANGEROUS_CHARS_INSIDE_DOUBLE_QUOTES.any? { |char| user_input.include?(char) }
-          next false
+      # Now check the quote state at the start of user_input
+      start_quote_state = quote_state
+
+      # Parse through the user_input to see what the quote state would be at the end
+      user_input.each_char do |char|
+        if quote_state.nil?
+          # If we start unquoted, user input is not safely encapsulated
+          return false
+        elsif quote_state == "'"
+          # In single quotes, check if user input contains a single quote
+          if char == "'"
+            # User input contains the quote character that would close the encapsulation
+            return false
+          end
+        elsif quote_state == '"'
+          # In double quotes, check for dangerous characters
+          if char == '"'
+            # User input contains the quote character that would close the encapsulation
+            return false
+          elsif char == '\\'
+            # Backslash in double quotes is dangerous
+            return false
+          elsif DANGEROUS_CHARS_INSIDE_DOUBLE_QUOTES.any? { |dangerous| char == dangerous }
+            return false
+          end
         end
-
-        next true
       end
-    end
 
-    def self.get_current_and_next_segments(segments)
-      segments.each_cons(2).map { |current_segment, next_segment| {current_segment: current_segment, next_segment: next_segment} }
+      # Verify that after the user_input, we're still in the same quote state
+      # by checking the character immediately after
+      end_index = occurrence_index + user_input.length
+      if end_index < command.length
+        # Continue parsing to verify the quote is properly closed
+        char_after = command[end_index]
+        
+        if quote_state == "'" && char_after == "'"
+          # Good: single quote is closed
+          return true
+        elsif quote_state == '"' && char_after == '"'
+          # Good: double quote is closed
+          return true
+        else
+          # The quote is not properly closed immediately after
+          return false
+        end
+      else
+        # User input is at the end of command, not properly closed
+        return false
+      end
     end
 
     # Helper function for sorting commands by length (longer commands first)
diff --git a/test/aikido/zen/scanners/shell_injection/helpers_test.rb b/test/aikido/zen/scanners/shell_injection/helpers_test.rb
index fdee298f..b43ac566 100644
--- a/test/aikido/zen/scanners/shell_injection/helpers_test.rb
+++ b/test/aikido/zen/scanners/shell_injection/helpers_test.rb
@@ -153,4 +153,32 @@ def refute_contains_shell_syntax(command, user_input = command)
     assert_contains_shell_syntax "command -disable-update-check -target https://examplx.com|curl+https://cde-123.abc.domain.com+%23 -json-export /tmp/5891/8526757.json -tags microsoft,windows,exchange,iis,gitlab,oracle,cisco,joomla -stats -stats-interval 3 -retries 3 -no-stdin",
       "https://examplx.com|curl+https://cde-123.abc.domain.com+%23"
   end
+
+  test "rejects input between empty quote pairs (CVE fix)" do
+    # Test case from vulnerability report: printf '';id #''
+    # The semicolon is between empty quotes, not inside quotes
+    refute_is_safely_encapsulated "printf '';id #''", ";id #"
+  end
+
+  test "rejects input with escaped quotes (CVE fix)" do
+    # Test case from vulnerability report: echo \";id;echo\"
+    # The quotes are escaped (literal), not active delimiters
+    refute_is_safely_encapsulated 'echo \";id;echo\"', ";id;echo"
+  end
+
+  test "rejects input between adjacent empty quotes" do
+    refute_is_safely_encapsulated "echo '';rm -rf''", ";rm -rf"
+    refute_is_safely_encapsulated "printf '';whoami''", ";whoami"
+  end
+
+  test "rejects input with escaped double quotes around it" do
+    refute_is_safely_encapsulated 'ls \";cat /etc/passwd;\"', ";cat /etc/passwd;"
+    refute_is_safely_encapsulated 'echo \";id;\"', ";id;"
+  end
+
+  test "properly handles backslash escaping in double quotes" do
+    # In double quotes, backslash escapes the next character
+    # echo "test\";id;echo\"more" - the quotes after backslashes are literal
+    refute_is_safely_encapsulated 'echo "test\";id;echo\"more"', ";id;echo"
+  end
 end
diff --git a/test/aikido/zen/scanners/shell_injection_scanner_test.rb b/test/aikido/zen/scanners/shell_injection_scanner_test.rb
index 8ab7c8ee..40711adf 100644
--- a/test/aikido/zen/scanners/shell_injection_scanner_test.rb
+++ b/test/aikido/zen/scanners/shell_injection_scanner_test.rb
@@ -400,4 +400,28 @@ def stub_payload(source, value, path)
       assert_equal "ls /app/users/user; rm -rf /app/users", attack.command
     end
   end
+
+  test "detects shell injection with empty quote pairs (CVE fix)" do
+    # Test case from vulnerability report: printf '';id #''
+    # The input ;id # is placed between empty quote pairs
+    assert_attack "printf '';id #''", ";id #"
+  end
+
+  test "detects shell injection with escaped quotes (CVE fix)" do
+    # Test case from vulnerability report: echo \";id;echo\"
+    # The quotes are escaped, so they're literal characters, not delimiters
+    assert_attack 'echo \";id;echo\"', ";id;echo"
+  end
+
+  test "detects shell injection when input is between adjacent quotes" do
+    # Additional test cases for the vulnerability
+    assert_attack "echo '';rm -rf /;''", ";rm -rf /;"
+    assert_attack "printf '';whoami;''", ";whoami;"
+  end
+
+  test "detects shell injection with escaped double quotes" do
+    # More test cases with escaped quotes
+    assert_attack 'ls \";cat /etc/passwd;\"', ";cat /etc/passwd;"
+    assert_attack 'echo \";id;\"', ";id;"
+  end
 end