fix(devframe): contain remote asset materialization (#328)

Author: antfubot

packages/devframe/src/utils/remote-assets.test.ts

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 import type { AddressInfo } from 'node:net'
 import type { MockInstance } from 'vitest'
-import type { RemoteAssets, RemoteAssetsErrorMessage, RemoteAssetsStore } from '../types/remote-assets'
+import type { RemoteAssets, RemoteAssetsErrorMessage, RemoteAssetsProviderCustom, RemoteAssetsStore } from '../types/remote-assets'
 import { existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, realpathSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs'
 import { createServer } from 'node:http'
 import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
-import { join } from 'node:path'
+import { dirname, join } from 'node:path'
 import { pathToFileURL } from 'node:url'
 import { H3, toNodeHandler } from 'h3'
 import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
@@ -188,6 +188,43 @@ describe('resolveStaticAssetsSource (remote store)', () => {
     expect(existsSync(join(target, 'package.json'))).toBe(false)
   })
 
+  it('rejects unsafe provider-listed paths before fetching or writing them', async () => {
+    const calls: string[] = []
+    const fetchImpl: typeof globalThis.fetch = async (input) => {
+      const url = String(input)
+      calls.push(url)
+      return url.endsWith('/dist/assets/app.js') ? new Response('console.log("app")') : new Response('should never be served')
+    }
+    const provider: RemoteAssetsProviderCustom = {
+      fileUrl: (pkg, version, filePath) => `https://mirror.example.com/${pkg}@${version}/${filePath}`,
+      // A compromised (or merely buggy) custom provider — every entry below is
+      // unsafe or out of scope except the one normal nested asset.
+      listFiles: async () => [
+        'package.json', // ordinary file outside the selected prefix — stays ignored
+        'dist/assets/app.js', // a normal nested asset — still materializes
+        'dist/../evil-traversal.txt', // prefixed traversal entry
+        '/outside/evil-absolute.txt', // absolute path entry
+        'dist/evil\\..\\..\\evil-backslash.txt', // backslash traversal entry — rejected on every platform
+        'dist-confusable/evil-prefix.txt', // prefix-confusion entry — outside the selected prefix
+      ],
+    }
+    const store = storeFor({ fetch: fetchImpl }, makeTmp(), { provider })
+    const target = makeTmp()
+
+    await store.materialize(target)
+
+    // The one normal nested asset still materializes.
+    expect(readFileSync(join(target, 'assets/app.js'), 'utf8')).toBe('console.log("app")')
+    // Nothing else was fetched...
+    expect(calls).toEqual([expect.stringContaining('/dist/assets/app.js')])
+    // ...or written, inside or outside the target directory.
+    expect(existsSync(join(target, 'package.json'))).toBe(false)
+    expect(existsSync(join(target, 'evil-traversal.txt'))).toBe(false)
+    expect(existsSync(join(dirname(target), 'evil-traversal.txt'))).toBe(false)
+    expect(existsSync(join(target, 'evil-backslash.txt'))).toBe(false)
+    expect(existsSync(join(dirname(target), 'evil-prefix.txt'))).toBe(false)
+  })
+
   it('supports the unpkg provider URL scheme', async () => {
     const calls: string[] = []
     const fetchImpl: typeof globalThis.fetch = async (input) => {

packages/devframe/src/utils/remote-assets.ts

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import { createRequire } from 'node:module'
 import { Readable } from 'node:stream'
 import { lookup } from 'mrmime'
 import { createDebug } from 'obug'
-import { dirname, extname, join, normalize, sep } from 'pathe'
+import { dirname, extname, isAbsolute, join, normalize, resolve, sep } from 'pathe'
 import { diagnostics } from '../node/diagnostics'
 
 const debugFetch = createDebug('devframe:remote-assets:fetch')
@@ -189,6 +189,27 @@ function candidatePaths(prefix: string, cleaned: string): string[] {
   return candidates
 }
 
+/**
+ * Resolve the safe destination for a provider-listed `filePath` beneath
+ * `prefix`, materializing into the already-resolved `root`, or `null` when
+ * the entry is unsafe or lies outside the selected `prefix`. A compromised
+ * provider is an untrusted boundary even though the built-in jsDelivr/unpkg
+ * listings never emit any of this — reject an absolute path, a backslash
+ * (never normalized into a separator; Windows-style traversal stays rejected
+ * on every platform), and any suffix whose resolved destination would land
+ * outside `root`. `target === root` is deliberately unsafe too: it names the
+ * directory itself, never a writable file.
+ */
+function materializeTarget(filePath: string, prefix: string, root: string): string | null {
+  if (filePath.includes('\\') || isAbsolute(filePath) || !filePath.startsWith(prefix))
+    return null
+  const suffix = filePath.slice(prefix.length)
+  if (!suffix || isAbsolute(suffix))
+    return null
+  const target = resolve(root, suffix)
+  return target === root || !target.startsWith(root + sep) ? null : target
+}
+
 function createStore(assets: RemoteAssets, cacheDir: string): RemoteAssetsStore {
   const normalized = { ...assets, path: assets.path ?? 'dist' }
   const { provider, name: providerName } = resolveProvider(assets)
@@ -340,8 +361,11 @@ function createStore(assets: RemoteAssets, cacheDir: string): RemoteAssetsStore
     catch (error) {
       return fail(errText(error), error)
     }
-    for (const filePath of files.filter(f => f.startsWith(prefix))) {
-      const target = join(targetDir, filePath.slice(prefix.length))
+    const root = resolve(targetDir)
+    for (const filePath of files) {
+      const target = materializeTarget(filePath, prefix, root)
+      if (target == null)
+        continue
       const url = provider.fileUrl(normalized.package, normalized.version, filePath)
       let res: Response
       try {

plans/README.md

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Generated by the improve skill on 2026-09-01 at commit `2d978f84`. Execute in th
 | 001 | Pin privileged GitHub Actions dependencies | P1 | S | - | TODO |
 | 002 | Require authentication on route-based MCP | P1 | M | 001 | TODO |
 | 003 | Enforce shared-state exposure policy on direct MCP reads | P1 | S | 002 | TODO |
-| 004 | Contain remote asset materialization | P1 | S | - | TODO |
+| 004 | Contain remote asset materialization | P1 | S | - | DONE |
 | 005 | Block Data Inspector prototype-chain writes | P1 | S | - | DONE |
 | 006 | Validate request-derived authentication-link origins | P1 | M | - | TODO |
 | 007 | Reject pre-existing symlink escapes from filesystem roots | P2 | M | - | TODO |