ci: prevent script injection in Prerelease workflow - #192
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Bind user-controlled GitHub context values to step-level env vars instead of interpolating them directly into inline run: scripts: - github.event.inputs.tag_name (workflow_dispatch input) - github.ref_name (feature/* and release/* branch handling) Following GitHub Actions security-hardening guidance, the values are now passed via env: and referenced as quoted shell variables, so a crafted branch name or dispatch input can no longer be interpreted as script. Resolves ACAT/GithubWorkflowIdentifier finding (script injection in GitHub Actions workflows).
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Summary
Fixes an ACAT/AppSec script injection finding in
.github/workflows/release.yml(the Prerelease workflow). Three user-controlled GitHub context values were interpolated directly via${{ }}into inlinerun:scripts. An attacker who controls aworkflow_dispatchinput or pushes a branch with a crafted name could inject arbitrary shell commands into a job that runs withcontents: write.github.event.inputs.tag_namerun: echo "TAG_NAME=..."workflow_dispatchgithub.ref_namefeature/*handlingpushgithub.ref_namerelease/*handlingpushFix
Per GitHub Actions security-hardening guidance, each untrusted value is now bound to a step-level
env:variable and referenced as a quoted shell variable ($TAG_NAME_INPUT,"$REF_NAME"). Environment values are passed to the shell as data rather than expanded into script text, which removes the injection vector. No behavior change for legitimate inputs.Testing
python3 -c "import yaml; yaml.safe_load(open('.github/workflows/release.yml'))"-> parses OK${{ github.* }}interpolation remains inside anyrun:block; the remaining references are all insideenv:blocks (the safe pattern).