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test: nonce manager unit tests, docker-compose, and smoke test#3

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test: nonce manager unit tests, docker-compose, and smoke test#3
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MoltyCel:mainfrom
HaraldeRoessler:test/nonce-manager-docker-smoke

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@HaraldeRoessler HaraldeRoessler commented Apr 1, 2026

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Summary

  • 7 unit tests for app/nonce_manager.py (introduced in PR fix: async Web3 calls + nonce manager to prevent event loop blocking #2) covering sequential nonces, concurrent safety, reset/refetch, and per-address independence
  • docker-compose.yml for one-command local dev setup (PostgreSQL 16 + API)
  • scripts/smoke_test.sh hitting key endpoints with pass/fail reporting

How to use

Run unit tests:

pip install pytest pytest-asyncio
python -m pytest tests/test_nonce_manager.py -v

Start local dev environment:

docker compose up --build
# API at http://localhost:8000, PostgreSQL at localhost:5432

Run smoke test:

# Against local docker-compose
./scripts/smoke_test.sh http://localhost:8000 dev_test_key_local

# Against production
./scripts/smoke_test.sh https://api.moltrust.ch your_api_key

Test results (local)

All 7 nonce manager tests pass:

tests/test_nonce_manager.py::test_first_call_fetches_from_chain PASSED
tests/test_nonce_manager.py::test_second_call_increments_locally PASSED
tests/test_nonce_manager.py::test_sequential_calls_produce_unique_nonces PASSED
tests/test_nonce_manager.py::test_different_addresses_are_independent PASSED
tests/test_nonce_manager.py::test_reset_forces_refetch PASSED
tests/test_nonce_manager.py::test_reset_nonexistent_address_is_noop PASSED
tests/test_nonce_manager.py::test_concurrent_calls_get_unique_nonces PASSED

Depends on #2

Generated with Claude Code

HaraldeRoessler and others added 3 commits April 1, 2026 14:51
@HaraldeRoessler @claude
fix: wrap blocking Web3 calls in asyncio.to_thread and add nonce manager
d1ac705 
All synchronous Web3 RPC calls (get_transaction_count, gas_price,
send_raw_transaction, wait_for_transaction_receipt, is_connected) were
blocking the FastAPI async event loop, causing latency spikes for all
concurrent users.

Changes:
- Add app/nonce_manager.py with per-address asyncio.Lock to prevent
  nonce collisions when multiple async handlers submit transactions
  concurrently from the same wallet
- Wrap all blocking Web3 calls in asyncio.to_thread() across main.py,
  erc8004.py, and provenance/anchor.py
- Convert erc8004.py functions (post_reputation_feedback,
  register_onchain_agent, get_onchain_reputation) from sync to async
  and update all call sites with await
- Replace music VC anchoring via cast CLI subprocess with web3.py,
  eliminating private key exposure in process environment

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@HaraldeRoessler @claude
test: add nonce manager unit tests, docker-compose, and smoke test
f98ebe3 
- Add tests/test_nonce_manager.py with 7 tests covering: first fetch,
  local increment, sequential uniqueness, per-address independence,
  reset/refetch, and concurrent nonce safety (20 parallel requests)
- Add docker-compose.yml for one-command local dev (PostgreSQL + API)
- Add scripts/smoke_test.sh hitting key endpoints (health, identity,
  reputation, credentials, auth enforcement)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@HaraldeRoessler @claude
fix: smoke test bash compatibility, docker-compose improvements
0f005a3 
Found during local testing:
- set -u breaks with empty arrays in bash, changed to set -eo pipefail
- ((PASS++)) returns exit code 1 when PASS=0 under set -e, use arithmetic
- Endpoint expectations adjusted to match actual API behavior
- Unique agent names per run to avoid 409 duplicate detection
- Auth test uses separate curl without valid key header
- docker-compose: add DB_HOST, DID_PRIVATE_KEY_HEX for test signing,
  env_file for optional Dilithium keys, remove obsolete version field

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@HaraldeRoessler HaraldeRoessler mentioned this pull request Apr 1, 2026
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HaraldeRoessler commented Apr 1, 2026

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Merge order

Depends on #1 (needs requirements.txt and Dockerfile). Merge after #1.

Sequence: #1 → #3 → #2 → #4 → #7

Update: Smoke test and docker-compose fixed based on local testing — all 7 tests pass.

This was referenced Apr 1, 2026
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This was referenced Apr 30, 2026
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HaraldeRoessler added a commit to HaraldeRoessler/moltrust-api that referenced this pull request Apr 30, 2026
@HaraldeRoessler @claude
ci: initial GitHub Actions workflow (install + syntax + pytest collect)
d388b5e 
First-cut CI for moltrust-api — three lightweight jobs that catch the
most-common breakage without needing a running API stack:

  install         pip install -r requirements.txt on Python 3.12
                  (matches Dockerfile). Flags dep conflicts.
  syntax          python -m compileall on every source dir.
                  Catches SyntaxError before deploy.
  pytest-collect  pytest --collect-only on root test_*.py files.
                  Catches test ImportError without booting sandbox.

Deliberately omitted (each is a follow-up of its own):

  - lint (ruff/flake8): existing code may have legacy style issues
    that would block this PR; better added in a dedicated PR.
  - test execution: existing tests target localhost:8005 and need
    the API + Postgres + Web3 stack online. PR MoltyCel#3 adds
    docker-compose.yml + scripts/smoke_test.sh which would slot in
    as a fourth job once merged.

Closes (in part) MoltyCel#9 "RFC: CI/CD pipeline and automated testing".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
HaraldeRoessler added a commit to HaraldeRoessler/moltrust-api that referenced this pull request May 12, 2026
@HaraldeRoessler @claude
security: round-3 — CodeQL triage fixes (5 real findings + 4 dismissals)
3d1b5aa 
Follow-up to commit d25e70c (SSRF). After running CodeQL default-setup
on the fork, 17 additional findings surfaced. Triage outcome:

  Already closed by earlier commits this PR:   1 (SSRF)
  False positives (dismissed via CodeQL UI):   4
  Real findings fixed in this commit:          5
  Stack-trace-exposure (deferred to design):   7

FIXES IN THIS COMMIT

  #1 [LOG SANITISATION] credit_middleware exception swallows DB password
     - app/main.py (logger.error in credit_middleware)
     `logger.error("…: %s", caller_did, e)` — the raw exception `e`
     can be an asyncpg ConnectionError whose repr() includes the
     Postgres connection string (with the password). Log only
     `type(e).__name__` instead.

  #2 [DEFENSIVE URL ENCODING] /join?ref= referrer parameter
     - app/main.py /join handler
     The redirect target is HARDCODED to https://moltrust.ch — the
     host is not user-controlled. But `f"https://moltrust.ch?ref={ref}"`
     interpolates `ref` raw, and a payload like `ref="x&malparam=…"`
     could corrupt the query string. Use `urllib.parse.quote(ref)` to
     percent-encode the value before interpolation.

  MoltyCel#3 [STDOUT TOKEN LEAK] telegram_hn_remind print(r.text)
     - scripts/telegram_hn_remind.py
     `print(f'Status: {r.status_code}, Response: {r.text}')` — if
     Telegram error responses ever echo the request URL (which contains
     the bot token in the path), the body lands in stdout / CI scrollback.
     Print only the status code.

  MoltyCel#4 [ReDoS] mpp authorization header regex
     - packages/mpp/index.js
     `auth.match(/^(?:Payment|MPP)\s+(.+)$/i)` on an unbounded header
     is polynomial-quadratic. This package is published to npm, so
     consumer servers carry the risk. Cap header at 8 KiB and use
     bounded `\s{1,8}` with a non-greedy first char.

  MoltyCel#5 [ReDoS] moltrust-openclaw-v2 base URL trim
     - moltrust-openclaw-v2/src/client.ts
     `.replace(/\/+$/, "")` is polynomial on pathological inputs.
     Replace with a `while (str.endsWith("/")) str = str.slice(0, -1)`
     loop, which is linear.

DISMISSED AS FALSE POSITIVES (no code change)

  MoltyCel#14 py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data at SPIFFE bind log
      Logs spiffe_uri, did, caller_did — none are passwords. CodeQL
      misfires on the "did" → "id" → "password" name-similarity heuristic.

  MoltyCel#13, MoltyCel#12 py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data in scripts/threadwatch.py
      Telegram bot token flows into the request URL but never into a
      logger or print() call — only to requests.post (which doesn't
      log URLs by default).

  MoltyCel#16 py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing in _reg_tracker
      This is in-memory rate-limit bucket-key derivation, not password
      storage. bcrypt/argon2 would be wrong here (slow + salted breaks
      the lookup). SHA-256 of the full API key is the correct primitive
      for an O(1) tracker.

EXPLICITLY DEFERRED (7 stack-trace-exposure findings)

  Multiple endpoints currently return `{"error": str(e)[:100]}` to
  callers. CodeQL flags these as info disclosure. Fixing them means
  changing the API contract — clients that parse the `error` field
  would break. This is a design call for the maintainer; deferring
  to a separate PR + discussion rather than including in this hardening
  pass.

VERIFICATION

  Python 3.12 AST parse — app/main.py + scripts/telegram_hn_remind.py
  compile cleanly. `node -c packages/mpp/index.js` clean. The TS file
  change is a syntactically-trivial loop, not type-impacting.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
HaraldeRoessler added a commit to HaraldeRoessler/moltrust-api that referenced this pull request May 18, 2026
@HaraldeRoessler @claude
security: round-3 — CodeQL triage fixes (5 real findings + 4 dismissals)
cf78c7e 
Follow-up to commit d25e70c (SSRF). After running CodeQL default-setup
on the fork, 17 additional findings surfaced. Triage outcome:

  Already closed by earlier commits this PR:   1 (SSRF)
  False positives (dismissed via CodeQL UI):   4
  Real findings fixed in this commit:          5
  Stack-trace-exposure (deferred to design):   7

FIXES IN THIS COMMIT

  #1 [LOG SANITISATION] credit_middleware exception swallows DB password
     - app/main.py (logger.error in credit_middleware)
     `logger.error("…: %s", caller_did, e)` — the raw exception `e`
     can be an asyncpg ConnectionError whose repr() includes the
     Postgres connection string (with the password). Log only
     `type(e).__name__` instead.

  #2 [DEFENSIVE URL ENCODING] /join?ref= referrer parameter
     - app/main.py /join handler
     The redirect target is HARDCODED to https://moltrust.ch — the
     host is not user-controlled. But `f"https://moltrust.ch?ref={ref}"`
     interpolates `ref` raw, and a payload like `ref="x&malparam=…"`
     could corrupt the query string. Use `urllib.parse.quote(ref)` to
     percent-encode the value before interpolation.

  MoltyCel#3 [STDOUT TOKEN LEAK] telegram_hn_remind print(r.text)
     - scripts/telegram_hn_remind.py
     `print(f'Status: {r.status_code}, Response: {r.text}')` — if
     Telegram error responses ever echo the request URL (which contains
     the bot token in the path), the body lands in stdout / CI scrollback.
     Print only the status code.

  MoltyCel#4 [ReDoS] mpp authorization header regex
     - packages/mpp/index.js
     `auth.match(/^(?:Payment|MPP)\s+(.+)$/i)` on an unbounded header
     is polynomial-quadratic. This package is published to npm, so
     consumer servers carry the risk. Cap header at 8 KiB and use
     bounded `\s{1,8}` with a non-greedy first char.

  MoltyCel#5 [ReDoS] moltrust-openclaw-v2 base URL trim
     - moltrust-openclaw-v2/src/client.ts
     `.replace(/\/+$/, "")` is polynomial on pathological inputs.
     Replace with a `while (str.endsWith("/")) str = str.slice(0, -1)`
     loop, which is linear.

DISMISSED AS FALSE POSITIVES (no code change)

  MoltyCel#14 py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data at SPIFFE bind log
      Logs spiffe_uri, did, caller_did — none are passwords. CodeQL
      misfires on the "did" → "id" → "password" name-similarity heuristic.

  MoltyCel#13, MoltyCel#12 py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data in scripts/threadwatch.py
      Telegram bot token flows into the request URL but never into a
      logger or print() call — only to requests.post (which doesn't
      log URLs by default).

  MoltyCel#16 py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing in _reg_tracker
      This is in-memory rate-limit bucket-key derivation, not password
      storage. bcrypt/argon2 would be wrong here (slow + salted breaks
      the lookup). SHA-256 of the full API key is the correct primitive
      for an O(1) tracker.

EXPLICITLY DEFERRED (7 stack-trace-exposure findings)

  Multiple endpoints currently return `{"error": str(e)[:100]}` to
  callers. CodeQL flags these as info disclosure. Fixing them means
  changing the API contract — clients that parse the `error` field
  would break. This is a design call for the maintainer; deferring
  to a separate PR + discussion rather than including in this hardening
  pass.

VERIFICATION

  Python 3.12 AST parse — app/main.py + scripts/telegram_hn_remind.py
  compile cleanly. `node -c packages/mpp/index.js` clean. The TS file
  change is a syntactically-trivial loop, not type-impacting.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This was referenced May 22, 2026
Merged
Merged
MoltyCel pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 28, 2026
feat(openclaw-plugin): v2.0.0-alpha.2 — Re-§12-review alpha.2 blockers
bc94801 
Re-§12-Review für alpha.1 (run 2026-05-28 17:27 UTC, output
~/moltstack/reviews/20260528_172832_openclaw-plugin-v2.0.0-alpha.1_review.md)
votierte ÜBERARBEITEN. Drei neue Blocker für alpha.2 — alle in
diesem Commit adressiert.

Blocker #1 (Test-Lücke): kombinatorischer Pfad "own DID OK +
counterparty lookup fail + failOpen=true → ALLOW" war nicht getestet.
Test ergänzt in before-tool-call.test.ts.

Blocker #2 (Performance): sequenzielle Counterparty-Lookups in
before-tool-call.ts waren O(N × API-latency) — 4 DIDs × 50ms = 200ms+
Event-Loop-Block. Fix: Promise.allSettled + post-evaluation. Block-
Priority ist deterministisch (erste Counterparty im array order wins).
Own-DID-Check bleibt VOR counterparties (early-exit bei eigener
Insufficienz).

Blocker #3 (Air-Gap Lücke): die moltrust_verify / moltrust_trust_score /
moltrust_endorse Agent-Tools blieben auch bei minTrustScore=0 +
verifyOnStart=false beim Agent-Runtime registriert — LLM-Halluzinationen
konnten ungewollte DID-Lookups triggern. Neue Config-Option
`registerMoltrustTools` (default true). Wenn false: die 3 registerTool-
Calls werden geskipped, Tools sind für die LLM nicht aufrufbar. Slash-
Commands + RPC + Lifecycle-Hooks bleiben unverändert (explizite
Operator/User-Aktionen, nicht LLM-aufrufbar).

README: Privacy-Section schärft Disable-Anweisung — "Disabling
automatic outbound calls" (alt) vs neue "True air-gap mode" mit
registerMoltrustTools=false. Configuration-Beispiel zeigt neuen
Default-Wert.

Tests: 31 → 32 (1 neuer für kombinatorischen Pfad). Alle 32 grün,
tsc grün.

Re-Re-§12-Review läuft mit alpha.2-Briefing-Append vor npm publish.
This was referenced Jun 1, 2026
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Merged
MoltyCel added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 3, 2026
@MoltyCel
docs(specs): D-1 Acceptance-Gate architecture brief (design-only) (#128)
99ed910 
* docs(specs): D-1 Acceptance-Gate architecture brief (design-only)

Scope: AAE draft-04 §5 Step 1 (signature verify + signing-authority) + Step 2 (payload/schema/cty). Decisions: #1 JWS-wrapped VC submit-contract (extract blocks from verified payload; component-1 API/raw_canonical impact named); #2 did:web + did:moltrust launch (did:key follow-on); #3 resolve-and-verify with trust-tiering (trusted vs unverified_issuer, no hard-allowlist); #4 scope = steps 1+2 only (step 4 subject-binding + step 9 delegation = follow-ons). PyJWT 2.12.1 (no new dep). Canonicalization clarity: D-1 verifies JOSE-JWS bytes, not JCS raw_canonical. Open sign-off: DID-resolution depth/SSRF/caching, raw_canonical redefinition, trust-tier persistence.

* docs(specs): resolve 4 D-1 sign-off points (design-only)

1) DID-resolution SSRF/DoS = same egress-proxy as revocation_check (no new mitigation); did:web gated on proxy, D-1 LAUNCHES did:moltrust-only (no outbound, not proxy-gated). 2) raw_canonical = JWS-payload (trigger structurally unchanged); breaking submit-contract change, only smoke-rows affected. 3) trust-tier = new additive column issuer_trust_tier (trusted/unverified_issuer, analog value_source). 4) did:web VM-dereferencing = new layer (resolver gives raw DID-doc only). Phased launch: A did:moltrust-only now, B did:web when egress-proxy live.

* docs(specs): D-1 review-hardening — 4 criticals + 2 mediums resolved (design-only)

alg-confusion (explicit algorithms=[EdDSA] allowlist, never trust header alg); kid strict DID-URL validation + path-traversal/look-alike protection; canonicalization = exact b64url-decoded payload bytes (never re-serialize); submit rate-limit + per-issuer quota (PK already blocks exact replays); did:moltrust registry SPOF -> key rotation; JSON duplicate-keys reject via object_pairs_hook. Implementation contract, not architecture change.

---------

Co-authored-by: Lars Kroehl <kersten.kroehl@cryptokri.ch>
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@HaraldeRoessler