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4 changes: 4 additions & 0 deletions .Jules/sentinel.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -10,3 +10,7 @@
**Vulnerability:** Execution frameworks allowed untrusted automation configurations to open URLs with schemes like `file` and `x-apple.systempreferences`, effectively allowing arbitrary local execution or sandbox escapes via `NSWorkspace.shared.open`.
**Learning:** `NSWorkspace.shared.open` delegates URL handling directly to the OS, executing system preferences panes or opening arbitrary files. Bounding allowed schemes is critical, and a strict blocklist is required when an allowlist is too restrictive for general automation.
**Prevention:** Apply a strict blocklist for URL handlers (e.g. `file`, `x-apple.systempreferences`) at the core execution and validation levels when evaluating untrusted URL strings.
## 2026-06-25 - [Sandbox Escape via URL Handler Scheme expanded]

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⚠️ Potential issue | 🟡 Minor | ⚡ Quick win

Use a non-future changelog date for this entry.

Line 13 is dated 2026-06-25, which is in the future relative to June 21, 2026; please align it to the actual merge/log date to avoid audit confusion.

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.

In @.Jules/sentinel.md at line 13, The changelog entry header on line 13
contains a future date of 2026-06-25 which is after the current date of June 21,
2026. Update the date in the entry "## 2026-06-25 - [Sandbox Escape via URL
Handler Scheme expanded]" to use the actual merge or log date that is on or
before June 21, 2026, ensuring the changelog entry reflects the correct timeline
for audit purposes.

**Vulnerability:** Execution frameworks allowed untrusted automation configurations to open URLs with schemes like `shortcuts`, `terminal`, `ssh`, `telnet`, `vnc`, `ftp`, `smb`, `afp`, effectively allowing arbitrary local execution or sandbox escapes via `NSWorkspace.shared.open`.
**Learning:** Adding `file` and `x-apple.systempreferences` is not enough. Other local OS handlers (like `shortcuts://` or `terminal://`) can still perform actions directly from untrusted inputs without validation, acting as potential attack vectors.
**Prevention:** Apply a comprehensive blocklist for URL handlers containing all potentially dangerous schemes (e.g. `shortcuts`, `terminal`, `ssh`, `telnet`, `vnc`, `ftp`, `smb`, `afp`) at the core execution and validation levels when evaluating untrusted URL strings.
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -2,7 +2,18 @@ import Foundation


public enum AutomationSecurityPolicy {
public static let blockedURLSchemes: Set<String> = ["file", "x-apple.systempreferences"]
public static let blockedURLSchemes: Set<String> = [
"file",
"x-apple.systempreferences",
"shortcuts",
"terminal",
"ssh",
"telnet",
"vnc",
"ftp",
"smb",
"afp"
]
}

public struct AutomationValidationPolicy: Equatable, Sendable {
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