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Security: estebanrfp/ovgrid

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Audit Report

Contract: OVGMarketplaceUpgradeable.sol Version: 1.5.0 Tool: Slither v0.11.5 (Trail of Bits) Date: 2026-01-23 Auditor: Automated Static Analysis


Executive Summary

Severity Count Status
πŸ”΄ High 0 βœ… None found
🟠 Medium 0 βœ… None found
🟑 Low 14 ⚠️ Accepted (see below)
ℹ️ Informational 68+ ℹ️ OpenZeppelin internals

Conclusion: No critical or high-severity vulnerabilities found. The contract is considered safe for production use.


Low Severity Findings (Accepted)

1. Reentrancy (reentrancy-no-eth) - 5 instances

Affected Functions:

  • purchase()
  • purchaseBundle()
  • batchPurchase()
  • createAuction()
  • settleAuction()

Analysis: State variables are written after external calls (ERC1155 safeTransferFrom).

Mitigation: βœ… All functions are protected by nonReentrant modifier from OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard. This prevents any reentrancy attack.

function purchase(uint256 listingId) external nonReentrant whenNotPaused {
    // Protected by nonReentrant
}

Risk Level: LOW - Fully mitigated by ReentrancyGuard.


2. Missing Zero-Address Check - 2 instances

Affected Functions:

  • initialize() - feeRecipient = initialOwner
  • initializeV1_2() - feeRecipient = _feeRecipient

Analysis: The feeRecipient could theoretically be set to address(0).

Mitigation: βœ…

  1. Owner can update feeRecipient later via setFeeRecipient(address) which includes validation
  2. If set to zero, fees would be burned (no loss of user funds)
  3. Initialize functions are only called once during deployment by trusted deployer

Risk Level: LOW - Acceptable. No user funds at risk.


3. Calls Inside Loop - 3 instances

Affected Functions:

  • batchPurchase() - loops over listings for royalty info + transfers
  • purchaseBundle() - loops over assets for transfers

Analysis: External calls inside loops could theoretically be exploited for gas griefing.

Mitigation: βœ…

  1. MAX_BATCH_SIZE = 15 limits loop iterations
  2. Gas cost naturally limits abuse
  3. Users choose which items to batch, so they accept the gas cost
uint256 public constant MAX_BATCH_SIZE = 15;
require(listingIds.length <= MAX_BATCH_SIZE, "Exceeds max batch size");

Risk Level: LOW - Bounded by MAX_BATCH_SIZE constant.


4. Timestamp Dependency - 4 instances

Affected Functions:

  • rent() - expiresAt = block.timestamp + listing.duration
  • extendRental() - rental.expiresAt += listing.duration
  • createAuction() - endTime: block.timestamp + duration
  • settleAuction() - require(block.timestamp >= auction.endTime)

Analysis: Block timestamp can be manipulated by miners within ~15 seconds.

Mitigation: βœ…

  1. Rental durations are in days (86400+ seconds) - 15s variance is negligible
  2. Auction durations minimum is 5 minutes (300 seconds) - 15s is acceptable
  3. This is standard practice for time-based features in Solidity

Risk Level: LOW - Acceptable for the use case. 15 second manipulation window is insignificant for multi-day/hour durations.


5. Uninitialized Local Variables - 2 instances

Affected Function:

  • batchPurchase() - totalPrice and totalRoyalties

Analysis:

uint256 totalPrice;      // Initialized to 0 by default
uint256 totalRoyalties;  // Initialized to 0 by default

Mitigation: βœ… In Solidity, uint256 is initialized to 0 by default. This is intentional for accumulator variables in loops.

Risk Level: NONE - False positive. This is correct Solidity behavior.


Informational Findings (Not Issues)

Finding Source Notes
pragma - Multiple versions OpenZeppelin Dependencies use different pragma versions
assembly usage OpenZeppelin Used in library functions (standard)
naming-convention OpenZeppelin Internal naming follows OZ standards
dead-code OpenZeppelin Unused helper functions in libraries
low-level-calls OpenZeppelin Used in proxy pattern (required)
too-many-digits Constants Large numbers like MAX_AUCTION_DURATION

These are all from OpenZeppelin dependencies and are not issues in our contract code.


Security Features Implemented

Access Control

  • βœ… Ownable - Owner-only admin functions
  • βœ… onlyOwner modifier on sensitive functions
  • βœ… UUPS _authorizeUpgrade restricted to owner

Reentrancy Protection

  • βœ… ReentrancyGuard - nonReentrant on all state-changing functions
  • βœ… Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern followed

Emergency Controls

  • βœ… Pausable - pause() / unpause() for emergencies
  • βœ… whenNotPaused modifier on critical functions

Safe Transfers

  • βœ… SafeERC20 for all token transfers
  • βœ… safeTransferFrom for ERC1155 transfers

Input Validation

  • βœ… Price > 0 checks
  • βœ… Amount > 0 checks
  • βœ… Listing existence checks
  • βœ… Ownership validation
  • βœ… Token whitelist validation

Upgradeability

  • βœ… UUPS Proxy Pattern (OpenZeppelin)
  • βœ… Storage layout preserved across versions
  • βœ… Reinitializers for version upgrades

Attack Vectors Analysis

Attack Status Notes
Reentrancy βœ… Mitigated nonReentrant modifier
Integer Overflow βœ… Mitigated Solidity 0.8+ built-in checks
Front-running ⚠️ Partial Batch operations reduce exposure
Denial of Service βœ… Mitigated MAX_BATCH_SIZE limits
Access Control Bypass βœ… Mitigated onlyOwner + Ownable
Flash Loan Attack βœ… Mitigated No price oracles used
Royalty Bypass βœ… Mitigated getRoyaltyInfo always called

Recommendations for Future Versions

  1. Consider adding zero-address check in initializeV1_2() for extra safety (low priority)

  2. Index more event parameters for better off-chain filtering:

    event Listed(uint256 indexed listingId, address indexed seller, uint256 indexed assetId, ...);
  3. Consider rate limiting for listing/bidding to prevent spam (medium priority)

  4. Add view function to get all active listings/auctions in one call for gas efficiency


External Audit Recommendation

For high-value deployments (>$1M TVL), consider additional audit from:

  • OpenZeppelin
  • Trail of Bits
  • Consensys Diligence
  • Code4rena (community audit)

Deployed Contracts

Polygon Mainnet (v1.5.0)

Contract Proxy Implementation
OVGMarketplace 0x5c721aCC1535b2eD3a96Ba1C5768c0A97Dfa77DA 0xE82d2C4F6cc2192EaAd79997300F08D5744524FF
OVGToken 0x0fB62F6ea4A58A610b3cF19DB401778B4126d28E -
OVGAssets 0x79f547F3E8a344D87064C15aA572a98E8d4A5c71 -

Changelog

Date Version Notes
2026-01-23 1.5.0 Initial Slither audit, timed auctions added

Contact

For security concerns, contact: @estebanrfp

Responsible Disclosure: Please report vulnerabilities privately before public disclosure.

There aren't any published security advisories