These are hard rules, enforced by tests (tests/test_privacy.py). A change that violates any of them is a security bug, not a feature:

1. The video file itself never leaves the machine. No exception. Only extracted mono-16 kHz audio may be sent to a cloud STT API — and only when the user explicitly opted in (WATCHSKILL_CLOUD_STT_ENABLED / --cloud-stt). The default transcription fallback is local whisper.
2. No cookies, no logins. Acquisition only ever requests public data; Watch Skill never reads browser profiles or session state.
3. Frames sent to a configured vision provider are the user's choice. The provider (including fully local Ollama) is explicit configuration; nothing defaults to a cloud call without a key the user set. Every cloud call passes a cost guard first.
4. Keys are never logged, echoed, or persisted outside .env/env vars. SecretStr end to end; the doctor reports which providers are configured, never values.
5. The REST API refuses to bind non-loopback addresses without a bearer token.

Open a GitHub security advisory on oxbshw/watch-skill (Security → Report a vulnerability), or contact the maintainer (@oxbshw). Please include reproduction steps. You can expect an initial response within a week. Please do not open public issues for exploitable problems before a fix ships.

• watch-skill serve --http and watch-skill api are designed for localhost/trusted-network use. Hardening them for hostile networks (rate limiting, TLS) is deliberately out of scope for 0.x.
• yt-dlp and ffmpeg parse untrusted media; we ship self-updating yt-dlp and treat "stale yt-dlp" as a health defect, but sandboxing those parsers is the platform's job, not ours.