elek is designed as a review-only GitHub Action. The model-facing MCP server exposes only create_inline_comment and update_tracking_comment; it has no code path for approving, merging, closing, or changing repository settings.

Security fixes target the latest v1.x release and the moving v1 action tag. Pin selimozten/elek@v1 for normal use, or pin an exact patch tag when you need reproducible workflow behavior.

Do not open a public issue for vulnerabilities that expose credentials, repository write access, private code, or a bypass of the review-only tool surface.

Preferred reporting path:

1. Use GitHub private vulnerability reporting for this repository if it is available.
2. If private reporting is unavailable, open a minimal public issue asking for a private contact path. Do not include exploit details, tokens, logs, or private repository names in that issue.

Useful reports include:

• The action version or commit SHA.
• A minimal workflow snippet with secrets redacted.
• The GitHub event type and permissions block.
• Whether the run was on a fork PR.
• The provider/model used, with API keys redacted.
• A clear impact statement: token exposure, unauthorized write path, comment spoofing, dependency execution issue, or denial of service.

In scope:

• Token leakage in prompts, logs, comments, MCP buffers, or temporary files.
• A path that lets the model approve, merge, close, or mutate repository settings through elek.
• Unsafe default permissions or tool surfaces.
• Dependency or runtime behavior that executes untrusted code unexpectedly.
• Comment spoofing or identity confusion that could mislead maintainers.

Out of scope:

• Model hallucinations that do not gain privileges or leak sensitive data.
• Expected GitHub token limitations, such as GITHUB_TOKEN reviews not satisfying required reviewer counts.
• Findings that require the workflow owner to deliberately grant broad permissions and use mode: agent.