π‘οΈ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix Sandbox Escape via URL Handler Scheme#60
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π¨ Severity: HIGH π‘ Vulnerability: Execution frameworks allowed untrusted automation configurations to open URLs with schemes like `file` and `x-apple.systempreferences`, effectively allowing arbitrary local execution or sandbox escapes via `NSWorkspace.shared.open`. π― Impact: Attackers could use automation steps to execute local files or open system settings maliciously. π§ Fix: Added a strict blocklist for URL handlers (e.g. `file`, `x-apple.systempreferences`) at the core execution and validation levels when evaluating untrusted URL strings in `TriggerKit`. β Verification: Statically verified the code changes to ensure the blocklist properly prevents `file` and `x-apple.systempreferences` execution. Co-authored-by: NSEvent <44446865+NSEvent@users.noreply.github.com>
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No actionable comments were generated in the recent review. π βΉοΈ Recent review infoβοΈ Run configurationConfiguration used: defaults Review profile: CHILL Plan: Pro Plus Run ID: π Files selected for processing (2)
π§ Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (1)
π WalkthroughWalkthroughA hardcoded blocklist of dangerous URL schemes ( ChangesURL Scheme Blocklist for Sandbox Escape Prevention
Estimated code review effortπ― 2 (Simple) | β±οΈ ~8 minutes Possibly related PRs
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π§Ή Nitpick comments (1)
TriggerKit/Sources/TriggerKitRuntime/AutomationExecutor.swift (1)
453-456: β‘ Quick winCentralize blocked URL schemes to avoid policy drift.
Line 453 duplicates the same security-critical scheme list already defined in validation. Move this set to a shared constant in
TriggerKitCoreand consume it in both layers so validation/runtime canβt diverge over time.Proposed direction
- let blockedSchemes: Set<String> = ["file", "x-apple.systempreferences"] - if blockedSchemes.contains(scheme) { + if URLSchemeSecurity.blocked.contains(scheme) { return .failure("URL scheme blocked for security: \(scheme)") }π€ Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate. In `@TriggerKit/Sources/TriggerKitRuntime/AutomationExecutor.swift` around lines 453 - 456, The blockedSchemes set is hardcoded in the AutomationExecutor security check and duplicated elsewhere in the validation layer, creating risk of policy drift between the two layers. Extract the blockedSchemes Set as a shared constant in TriggerKitCore and replace all hardcoded instances in AutomationExecutor and the validation layer with references to this centralized constant, ensuring both layers always consume the same security-critical scheme list.
π€ Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
Nitpick comments:
In `@TriggerKit/Sources/TriggerKitRuntime/AutomationExecutor.swift`:
- Around line 453-456: The blockedSchemes set is hardcoded in the
AutomationExecutor security check and duplicated elsewhere in the validation
layer, creating risk of policy drift between the two layers. Extract the
blockedSchemes Set as a shared constant in TriggerKitCore and replace all
hardcoded instances in AutomationExecutor and the validation layer with
references to this centralized constant, ensuring both layers always consume the
same security-critical scheme list.
βΉοΈ Review info
βοΈ Run configuration
Configuration used: defaults
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro Plus
Run ID: 816e3cab-9e43-40e4-9321-b81b9665bc79
π Files selected for processing (3)
.Jules/sentinel.mdTriggerKit/Sources/TriggerKitCore/AutomationProgram+Validation.swiftTriggerKit/Sources/TriggerKitRuntime/AutomationExecutor.swift
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@jules Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the Nitpick comments:
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I have extracted the |
π¨ Severity: HIGH π‘ Vulnerability: Execution frameworks allowed untrusted automation configurations to open URLs with schemes like `file` and `x-apple.systempreferences`, effectively allowing arbitrary local execution or sandbox escapes via `NSWorkspace.shared.open`. π― Impact: Attackers could use automation steps to execute local files or open system settings maliciously. π§ Fix: Added a strict blocklist for URL handlers (e.g. `file`, `x-apple.systempreferences`) at the core execution and validation levels when evaluating untrusted URL strings in `TriggerKit`. The blocklist is centralized in `AutomationSecurityPolicy`. β Verification: Statically verified the code changes to ensure the blocklist properly prevents `file` and `x-apple.systempreferences` execution. Co-authored-by: NSEvent <44446865+NSEvent@users.noreply.github.com>
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix Sandbox Escape via URL Handler Scheme
π¨ Severity: HIGH
π‘ Vulnerability: Execution frameworks allowed untrusted automation configurations to open URLs with schemes like
fileandx-apple.systempreferences, effectively allowing arbitrary local execution or sandbox escapes viaNSWorkspace.shared.open.π― Impact: Attackers could use automation steps to execute local files or open system settings maliciously.
π§ Fix: Added a strict blocklist for URL handlers (e.g.
file,x-apple.systempreferences) at the core execution and validation levels when evaluating untrusted URL strings inTriggerKit.β Verification: Statically verified the code changes to ensure the blocklist properly prevents
fileandx-apple.systempreferencesexecution.PR created automatically by Jules for task 1944738734155530959 started by @NSEvent
Summary by CodeRabbit
file://and system preference schemes) before any external opening occurs.